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Abstract
We analyze a multiple-stage supply chain model of a seasonal product with pric-
ing decisions. We develop closed-form expressions for the optimal expected profits of
different stages. The results enable us to quantify the loss of supply chain profits if
uncoordinated pricing decisions are made by supply chain agents.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that when different parties in the supply chain make their ordering, pricing,
and inventory holding decisions independently, the overall supply chain profit suffers from
poor performance. In the supply chain management literature, numerous studies have been
reported to address this issue. Coordination mechanisms such as revenue-sharing contracts,
buyback contracts, volume discounts, etc. have been analyzed by many researchers for resolv-
ing the problem (see, for example, [3]). However, it is important to quantify the deficiency
of the uncoordinated decisions so that the potential benefits obtained from a coordinated
supply chain can be better understood.
In this paper we analyze a multiple-stage supply chain model of a seasonal product with
pricing decisions made independently by each party. The retailer is facing a price-sensitive
uncertain demand. Through extending the newsvendor model with pricing decisions, we
develop a closed-form expression for the optimal expected profit of the supply chain, and
we compare the total expected profit with that of an integrated system with centralized
decisions.
Whitin [13] was the first to develop and analyze a newsvendor model with price decisions.
Since then, numerous developments and applications of the newsvendor model with pricing
considerations have appeared in the literature (see [5, 11] for recent surveys on newsvendor
models with pricing decisions). Some of these works have extended the newsvendor model
with pricing to a two-stage supply chain setting and discussed various coordination issues.
These include the work on returns policies [6, 8, 10], the work on supply contracts and
manufacturer’s incentives [2, 4, 12], the work on supply chain pricing under risk aversion
[1], among others. However, unlike these papers, we consider a multiple-stage supply chain
and focus on the quantification of the ineffectiveness of decentralized supply-chain pricing
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decisions. For the case with two stages, our result is similar to some of the results in Wang
et al. [12]. However, Wang et al.’s model differs from ours in that they consider a two-stage
supply chain with a consignment sales arrangement.
Recently, Majumder and Srinivasan [9] have studied the impact of the position of the
contract leader on the performance of a multi-stage supply chain. Similar to our work,
they consider price-sensitive demand, derive the decentralized supply chain solution for their
model, and compare it with the centralized solution. Unlike our work, they assume a deter-
ministic linear demand function, and they focus on the implications of contract leadership.
For other published works that address coordination issues in multi-stage supply chains, see,
for example, [3, 7] and the references therein.
Our model is defined as follows: We consider an n-stage supply chain with a manufacturer,
a retailer, and n − 2 other parties such as distributer, wholesaler, etc. in between (n ≥ 2).
There is a single seasonal product facing an uncertain and price-sensitive demand. The
manufacturer produces each unit of the product at a cost of c. It has to determine the unit
price p1 of the product to offer to its immediate downstream customer, so as to maximize
its expected profit in anticipation of the reaction of the other supply chain parties after it
has announced the price p1. Once the price p1 is given, the next stage of the supply chain
has to determine the unit price p2 to offer to its downstream customer so as to maximize its
expected profit in anticipation of the reaction of the downstream supply chain parties. The
same logic applies to the other parties along the supply chain. The last stage of the supply
chain, i.e. the retailer, has to determine the unit price p to offer to the end customers as
well as the order quantity q. Thus, the retailer’s problem is a price-dependent newsvendor
problem. We refer this supply chain system to as the “decentralized” system. We denote
the manufacturer as M , the retailer as R, and the other parties as P2, P3, . . . , Pn−1 as shown
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in Figure 1. For notational convenience, we denote P1 ≡ M , Pn ≡ R, and p0 ≡ c. The
following assumptions are made:
• End customer’s demand is given as Db(p)ε, where ε is a nonnegative random variable
with a general probability distribution and Db(p) = ap
−b (a > 0; b > 1).
• Unsold items bear no salvage value or disposal cost.
The above multiplicative demand model with iso-elastic demand has been widely adopted
in the literature (see, for example, [11]). Without loss of generality, we assume a = 1.
Parameter b represents the price-elasticity index of the expected demand. In this study, we
focus on price-elastic products with b > 1. We let f(x) and F (x) denote the probability
density function and cumulative distribution function, respectively, of ε.
In the next section, we consider the optimal decision of each supply chain party in the
decentralized system, and we develop a closed-form expression for the optimal expected profit
of the supply chain. In section 3, we analyze the situation where there exists a centralized
decision maker, and then we compare the expected total profit of the decentralized system
with that of the centralized system. Section 4 concludes the paper and provides a comparison
between our model and Wang et al.’s [12] model with consignment contracts.
2 Optimal Decisions of the Decentralized System
We first consider the retailer’s decision. Following Petruzzi and Dada [11], we denote z = q·pb
and Λ(z) =
∫ z
0
F (x)dx =
∫ z
0
(z − x)f(x)dx. The retailer’s expected profit is given as
ΠR(p, z) = p · E
[
min{q,D(p)ε}
]
− pn−1q
3
= p−b
{
p · E
[
min{z, ε}
]
− pn−1z
}
= p−b
{
p
[
z − Λ(z)
]
− pn−1z
}
.
This implies that
∂ΠR(p, z)
∂p
= −(b− 1)p−b
[
z − Λ(z)
]
+ bp−b−1pn−1z
and
∂ΠR(p, z)
∂z
= p−b+1
[
1− F (z)
]
− p−bpn−1.
Setting these partial derivatives to zero, we have
p∗ =
bpn−1z
∗
(b− 1)
[
z∗ − Λ(z∗)
] (1)
and
p∗ =
pn−1
1− F (z∗)
, (2)
where p∗ and z∗ denote the optimal values of p and z, respectively. Note that the optimal
value of q is given as q∗ = z∗(p∗)−b. Combining (1) and (2), we obtain
bz∗
(b− 1)
[
z∗ − Λ(z∗)
] = 1
1− F (z∗)
. (3)
Equation (3) implies that z∗ is independent of pn−1. Let Π
∗
R denote the maximum expected
profit of the retailer. By (2) and (3), we have
Π∗R = ΠR(p
∗, z∗) =
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗p−b+1n−1 .
Next, we consider the decisions of P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1. The following theorem states the
optimal pricing decisions of these n − 1 parties and their corresponding optimal expected
profits.
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Theorem 1 For i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1, the expected profit of Pi is maximized when p
∗
i =
b
b−1
pi−1,
and the maximum expected profit of Pi is given as
Π∗Pi =
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b+i−1
c−b+1.
Proof We first prove that
p∗i =
b
b− 1
pi−1 (4)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. For the case where i = n− 1, the expected profit of Pn−1 is given as
ΠPn−1(pn−1) = (pn−1 − pn−2)q
∗
= (p∗)−b(pn−1 − pn−2)z
∗
=
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗p−bn−1(pn−1 − pn−2) (by (2)).
Since z∗ is independent of pn−1, this function is maximized when pn−1 = bpn−2/(b − 1).
Thus, equation (4) holds when i = n − 1. Next, by induction, suppose equation (4) holds
for i = j+1, j+2, . . . , n−1, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 2. Then
p∗n−1 =
b
b− 1
· p∗n−2 =
( b
b− 1
)2
p∗n−3 = · · · =
( b
b− 1
)n−j−2
p∗j+1 =
( b
b− 1
)n−j−1
pj.
Hence,
ΠPj (pj) = (pj − pj−1)q
∗
= (p∗)−b(pj − pj−1)z
∗
=
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗(p∗n−1)
−b(pj − pj−1) (by (2))
=
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−j−1)b
p−bj (pj − pj−1), (5)
which is maximized when pj = bpj−1/(b − 1). Thus, equation (4) also holds for i = j.
Therefore, equation (4) holds for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
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By (4) and (5), the maximum expected profit of Pi is
Π∗Pi =
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−i−1)b
(p∗i )
−b(p∗i − p
∗
i−1)
=
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−i)b
(p∗i−1)
−b+1
=
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−i)b( b
b− 1
)
−(i−1)(b−1)
p−b+10
=
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b+i−1
c−b+1.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
By Theorem 1, we can determine the maximum expected total profit of the decentralized
system:
Π∗ =
n∑
i=1
Π∗Pi
=
n∑
i=1
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b+i−1
c−b+1
=
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b[( b
b− 1
)n
− 1
]
c−b+1. (6)
3 Comparing the Centralized and Decentralized Sys-
tems
In this section, we first analyze the situation where there exists a centralized decision
maker for determining p and q so as to maximize the expected systemwide total profit.
We perform this analysis so that we can compare the total profits of the centralized and
decentralized systems. We let pˆ, qˆ, and zˆ denote the values of p, q, and z, respectively, in
the centralized system. The centralized system’s expected profit, which includes the profits
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of both the manufacturer and the retailer, is
Πˆ(pˆ, zˆ) = pˆ · E
[
min{qˆ, D(pˆ)ε}
]
− cqˆ
= pˆ−b
{
pˆ · E
[
min{zˆ, ε}
]
− czˆ
}
= pˆ−b
{
pˆ
[
zˆ − Λ(zˆ)
]
− czˆ
}
.
This implies that
∂Πˆ(pˆ, zˆ)
∂pˆ
= −(b− 1)pˆ−b
[
zˆ − Λ(zˆ)
]
+ bpˆ−b−1czˆ
and
∂Πˆ(pˆ, zˆ)
∂zˆ
= pˆ−b+1
[
1− F (zˆ)
]
− pˆ−bc.
Setting these partial derivatives to zero, we have
pˆ∗ =
bczˆ∗
(b− 1)
[
zˆ∗ − Λ(zˆ∗)
] (7)
and
pˆ∗ =
c
1− F (zˆ∗)
, (8)
where pˆ∗ and zˆ∗ denote the optimal values of pˆ and zˆ, respectively. Combining (7) and (8),
we obtain
bzˆ∗
(b− 1)
[
zˆ∗ − Λ(zˆ∗)
] = 1
1− F (zˆ∗)
. (9)
From (3) and (9), we have zˆ∗ = z∗. Hence, the maximum expected profit of the centralized
system is given as
Πˆ∗ = Πˆ(pˆ∗, zˆ∗)
= (pˆ∗)−b
{
pˆ∗
[
zˆ∗ − Λ(zˆ∗)
]
− czˆ∗
}
=
1
b− 1
[
1− F (zˆ∗)
]b
zˆ∗c−b+1 (by (8) and (9))
=
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗c−b+1. (10)
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Next, we analyze the performance of the decentralized system by comparing its expected
total profit with that of the centralized counterpart. The percentage loss of channel profit
due to decentralization decisions is
∆n(b) =
Πˆ∗ − Π∗
Πˆ∗
.
Substituting (6) and (10) into this equation and simplifying, we have
∆n(b) =
{
1− (b− 1)
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b[( b
b− 1
)n
− 1
]}
× 100%.
The following theorem provides some important properties of the function ∆n(b).
Theorem 2 For any integer n ≥ 2, (i) the function ∆n(b) is increasing in b for b > 1, and
(ii) limb→∞∆n(b) = 1− ne
−(n−1).
Proof Define
η(λ) =
2(1− λ)
1 + λ
+ log λ
for 0 < λ ≤ 1. Note that
η′(λ) =
(1− λ)2
λ(1 + λ)2
> 0
for 0 < λ < 1. Thus, η is strictly increasing on (0, 1). This, together with the fact that
η(1) = 0, implies that η(λ) < 0 for 0 < λ < 1. Hence, for any µ ∈ (0, 1) and x > 1
2
, we have
η(µ2x) < 0, that is,
2(1− µ2x)
1 + µ2x
+ log µ2x < 0. (11)
Define
θµ(x) =
µ−x − µx
x
for x > 1
2
, where 0 < µ < 1. Then
θ′µ(x) = −
µ−x + µx
2x2
[2(1− µ2x)
1 + µ2x
+ log µ2x
]
> 0 (by (11)).
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Thus, θµ(x) is strictly increasing when x >
1
2
. This implies that when b > 1, the function
γb(n) =
( b−1
b
)−n/2 − ( b−1
b
)n/2
n/2
is strictly increasing for n ≥ 1. This, together with the property that γb(n) > 0, implies that
γ2b (1) < γ
2
b (n) for n > 1. In other words,
( b−1
b
)−1 + ( b−1
b
)− 2
1/4
<
( b−1
b
)−n + ( b−1
b
)n − 2
n2/4
,
or equivalently,
(b− 1
b
)n−1
+
(b− 1
b
)n+1
− 2
(b− 1
b
)n
<
1
n2
[
1 +
(b− 1
b
)2n
− 2
(b− 1
b
)n]
.
After rearranging terms, we have
n
[
1− ( b−1
b
)n−1
]
(n− 1)
[
1− ( b−1
b
)n
] > (n + 1)
[
1− ( b−1
b
)n
]
n
[
1− ( b−1
b
)n+1
] . (12)
Define
βb(n) =
n
[
1− ( b−1
b
)n−1
]
(n− 1)
[
1− ( b−1
b
)n
] .
Equation (12) implies that βb(n) is strictly decreasing in n, for any b > 1 and n = 2, 3, . . ..
Let α(b) = 1
b
·βb(2) + log
(
b−1
b
)
= 2
2b−1
+ log
(
b−1
b
)
. Then, limb→∞ α(b) = 0 and
α′(b) =
1
b(b− 1)(2b− 1)2
> 0
for b > 1. This implies that α(b) < 0 for b > 1, which in turn implies that
βb(2) < −b log
(b− 1
b
)
.
Hence,
βb(n) < −b log
(b− 1
b
)
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for n = 2, 3, . . .. Differentiating ∆n(b) with respect to b, we have
∆′(b) = −
(b− 1
b
)(n−1)(b−1){[
1−
(b− 1
b
)n−1]
n +
[
1−
(b− 1
b
)n]
(n− 1)b log
(b− 1
b
)}
= −
(b− 1
b
)(n−1)(b−1)[
1−
(b− 1
b
)n]
(n− 1)
[
βb(n) + b log
(b− 1
b
)]
> 0.
Therefore, ∆n(b) is increasing when b > 1.
Note that
lim
b→∞
(b− 1)
[( b
b− 1
)n
− 1
]
= lim
b→∞
( b
b−1
)n − 1
b
b−1
− 1
= n
and
lim
b→∞
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b
=
[
lim
b→∞
( b
b− 1
)
· lim
b→∞
(
1 +
1
b− 1
)b−1]−(n−1)
=
(
1 · e
)
−(n−1)
= e−(n−1).
Therefore, limb→∞∆n(b) = 1− ne
−(n−1).
Theorem 2 implies that the percentage loss of channel profit caused by decentralized
decisions increases as the price elasticity increases, but it is bounded from above by [1 −
ne−(n−1)]× 100%. Figure 2 depicts the function ∆n(b) for different values of n. As shown in
this figure, when the price-elasticity index b is large, the percentage loss of channel profit is
quite close to the upper bound. Furthermore, we observe that the loss in channel profit is
seriously affected by the number of stages in the supply chain.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a multiple-stage supply chain model with pricing decisions made indepen-
dently by each party, while the retailer is facing a price-sensitive uncertain demand. Our
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model allows us to quantify the loss in channel profit caused by uncoordinated pricing deci-
sions. The percentage loss of channel profit depends critically on the number of stages in the
supply chain and the price elasticity. For a given number of supply chain parties, an upper
bound exists on the percentage profit loss of channel profit.
Note that for a two-stage supply chain, the upper bound on the percentage loss of channel
profit is 1−(2/e) ≈ 26.4%, which is identical to channel profit loss in Wang et al.’s [12] model.
In fact, for the special case of n = 2, our mathematical analysis becomes essentially the same
as that in [12]. However, our model addresses the problem where the retailer is responsible
for setting the unit selling price of the product and determining the order quantity, while in
Wang et al.’s model the manufacturer chooses the selling price and the production quantity
under a consignment sales arrangement.
Consider an extension of Wang et al.’s model to an n-stage supply chain (n ≥ 3), where
the manufacturer decides on the retail price and retains ownership of the goods until they
are sold at the retailer. Figure 3 depicts such a system. Here, intermediate party Pi (i =
2, 3, . . . , n−1) serves as a middleman who obtains the consignment contract from its upstream
party and transfers it to its downstream party while keeping a portion of the revenue as its
own profit. We assume that the operating costs of the intermediate parties and the retailer
are zero. The manufacturer’s expected profit is given as
ΠM(p, z) = (p− p2) · E
[
min{q,D(p)ε}
]
− cq = p−b
{
p(1− ξ)
[
z − Λ(z)
]
− cz
}
,
where z = q · pb and ξ = p2/p. The profit of Pi (i = 2, 3, . . . , n) is given as
ΠPi(pi) = (pi − pi+1)E
[
min{q∗, D(p∗)ε}
]
,
where pn+1 ≡ 0. Following the method presented in Section 2, we can show that the expected
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profit of Pi is maximized when
p∗i +
c
1− F (z∗)
=
b
b− 1
[
pi+1 +
c
1− F (z∗)
]
and that the optimal expected profit of Pi is
Π∗Pi =
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b+n−i+1
c−b+1,
for i = 2, 3, . . . , n. The optimal expected profit of the manufacturer is
Π∗P1 = Π
∗
M =
1
b− 1
[
1− F (z∗)
]b
z∗
( b
b− 1
)
−(n−1)b
c−b+1.
Hence, the optimal expected total profit of this decentralized supply chain,
∑n
i=1 Π
∗
Pi
, is
identical to that presented in equation (6). This implies that the percentage loss of channel
profit shown in Figure 2 also applies to such a decentralized n-stage consignment model.
However, unlike the multiple-stage supply chain shown in Figure 1, it is less likely that such
an n-stage consignment model (n ≥ 3) exists in reality, since a manufacturer usually signs a
consignment contract directly with the retailer without going through intermediate parties.
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Figure 1. The n-stage supply chain 
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Figure 2. Percentage loss of channel profit versus price-elasticity index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The n-stage supply chain with consignment contracts 
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